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One of the key issues in relation to the 2014 European Parliament elections is the potential for an
unprecedented number of Eurosceptic and populist parties to secure seats. Simon Usherwood
writes that while Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP in the UK, the Front National in France, and the
PVV in the Netherlands may come out on top of their national votes, there are real obstacles to
them actively influencing the work of the parliament itself. Ultimately the main issue may be whether
they can use the platform gained in 2014 to secure real power in the next European elections in
2019.
One of the most long-standing predictions about the May elections has been that Eurosceptics will
do well. From the UK to Greece, Finland to Italy, voices that are critical of the EU and of European integration in
general have been on the advance. While that is likely to translate into success in seats, it will be important to
remember that such groups will operate under some severe constraints.
Eurosceptics have always been present in European
Parliament elections and have always won seats,
starting with the Danish People’s Movement in 1979.
Typically small in number, these MEPs normally
operated on the margins of the Parliament’s life, at best
adding a critical edge to some reports, but more likely
self-excluding themselves (as described by Nathalie
Brack). A series of somewhat ramshackle groupings
ensued, but to little effect.
With the current elections there is potential for this to
change significantly. Firstly, the pervasiveness of
Euroscepticism is much more striking. In traditionally
more sceptical member states, anti-EU parties are likely
to further increase their vote share: UKIP in the UK is
likely to take first place in both vote share and seats
won, even if it’s not yet evident in the polls. In some
previously pro-EU countries, sceptical voices are likely
to do well too: Golden Dawn in Greece and the Dutch
Freedom Party (PVV) are both polling well. Even in states that have traditionally driven integration, sceptics are
likely to make their influence felt, as in Germany, with the AfD, or France, with the FN. In short, the volume and
spread of sceptics will increase markedly.
Secondly, the degree of interaction between individual parties will be greater than before. Historically, sceptics have
been motivated primarily by nationally-constructed priorities, with little concern for what happened elsewhere. By
contrast, this cycle has seen the formation of an electoral pact between the FN and the PVV, with support from the
Belgian Vlaams Belang and the Italian Lega Nord. With the possible success of the French and Dutch parties, this
will be more than likely to produce enough MEPs to secure a grouping in the EP with a common agenda that
extends beyond the usual sceptic minimalism of “we all dislike the EU, but don’t agree on anything else.”
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 2014 elections have seen a growing wave of concern from non-sceptics
about the coming entrants. From politicians to the media and even in academia, the view is very much that
scepticism is a genuine point of concern and requires action. Seen in this light, the recent challenge by the pro-EU
Liberal Democrats to UKIP to a TV debate makes more sense – the first debate having been held yesterday, with a
second debate scheduled for 2 April.
Constraints on Eurosceptic parties
Taken together, there is every reason to suspect that Euroscepticism is about to enjoy at least a moment in the
limelight, from which it can potentially develop further. However, it is also important to take all of this with a large
pinch of salt, since a number of constraints are going to come into play.
The first key limitation will be the European Parliament itself. Over the past couple of decades, it has tightened up its
rules of procedure on the thresholds needed to form a group, primarily because it wanted to ring-fence more
marginal voices in the hemicycle. The consequence of this will be that Eurosceptics will find it hard to organise
themselves.
As I have discussed in more length elsewhere, the key problem will be that the parties likely to have most MEPs,
that is UKIP, the FN and the Conservatives, have mutually excluded themselves from working together, which either
means three separate groups, or two groups and a party – most likely the Conservatives – sitting as independents.
The most recent Pollwatch figures are instructive on this point, with a big increase in Independents, rather than in
the sceptic groupings.
This matters because an institutionally fragmented set of sceptics will wield less power in the EP’s system of
allocating key roles and duties, as well as having less access to institutional support. This latter point has been vital
for a series of parties over the years in securing a funding stream to develop their activities in their home country.
All this points to a second area where the impact of sceptics will be weaker. UKIP recognises that it would be political
suicide for the 2015 general election to be aligned with a far-right grouping in the European Parliament. So while
part of the antipathy between the FN and UKIP is policy-driven, it is also about personalities. A large number of the
sceptical parties have strong, charismatic leaders – Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Timo Soini, Beppo
Grillo, etc. – who have built up parties around themselves and who have either implicit or explicit modes of operation
that reject working with others.
In many cases, this is about marking their parties out as being different from the rest and offering a genuine place
for protest and alternative politics. But whatever the reasoning, it has the result that the culture of building common
cause with others will be that much more difficult. Witness the current Eurosceptic block in the Parliament – Europe
of Freedom and Democracy – which asks nothing of its constituent parties beyond holding a position of opposition
to the European Union, with a commensurate lack of voting cohesion.
Finally, even if there is more cooperation than in previous cycles, Eurosceptics remain a very diverse bunch.
Indeed, it is important to note that it is precisely this diversity that has bolstered the rise of critical voices across
Europe. Sceptics are drawn from across the political spectrum, with myriad critiques of the EU and its operation, so
to see them as all of a piece would be to miss their differences. In particular, the focus on populism and far-right
variants of Euroscepticism – while understandable – is to conflate different things: the green critique of integration
lies far from that of a radical right party, for instance.
Eurosceptics are divided by more than what they share in their scepticism. Beyond noting their dislike of the EU,
they struggle to agree on why they dislike it and – even more so – what should be done about it.
The upshot is that while sceptics are likely to do well in May, their impact on either the Parliament or the Union more
generally will be relatively small, for the reasons outlined above. The real danger will lie in pro-integration elements
assuming that this will solve the underlying problems. In that case, 2014 risks looking like a gentle preparation for
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what is to come in 2019.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/OW40jV
_________________________________
About the author
Simon Usherwood – University of Surrey
Simon Usherwood is Senior Lecturer in Politics and Deputy Head of the School of Politics,
University of Surrey. After study at the College of Europe and the LSE’s European Institute, his work
has focused on euroscepticism, both in the UK and more widely across the EU. He is coordinator of
the UACES Collaborative research Network on Euroscepticism and co-author of The European
Union: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2007).
3/3
